Developing more integrated regional partnerships (such as through frameworks proposed by former US Assistant Secretary of Defense Ely Ratner) are essential to pushing back against Beijing’s advances. Structured frameworks can facilitate deeper integration of regional security strategies, enabling countries to pool capabilities, share burdens and reinforce each other’s deterrent signals.  

Closer partnerships among countries also facilitate activities such as combined military exercises, joint scenario planning and real-time intelligence sharing. Those measures build not only operational capacity but also political credibility, suggesting to Beijing that coercion against Taiwan could trigger coordinated responses from a broad coalition.

Continued and visible military transits of the Taiwan Strait are also vital. Such transits serve three interlinked purposes: they uphold freedom of navigation under international law, signal international opposition to unilateral attempts to change the status quo and reaffirm that the strait isn’t Beijing’s territorial sea. In doing so, they strike at the heart of China’s efforts to redefine international norms in its favour.

A normalised pattern of transits by like-minded partners, including the US, Canadian, Japanese, Australian, New Zealand and European navies, makes it harder for Beijing to claim that those operations are provocative or illegitimate. Instead, routine and visible passages establish lawful presence as the norm. Such normalisation reassures regional states that navigational freedoms won’t erode under Chinese pressure.

Beyond partnerships and multilateral frameworks, more can be done to sustain the regional balance by bolstering Taiwan’s security, resilience and integration into global systems. Support can take many forms; here, the focus is on strengthening Taiwan’s defence and security sectors.

The US is already Taiwan’s primary security partner, providing arms sales, training and intelligence sharing. Yet other countries can also discreetly step up within the boundaries of their One-China policies. That diversifies Taiwan’s support base and reinforces the credibility of a global coalition committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific.

A practical framework for assisting Taiwan’s security can be built around five interlinked pillars: people-to-people engagement; technology cooperation; diplomatic support; training and resilience; and shared planning. Each pillar offers meaningful, scalable actions according to each partner’s political constraints and capacity.

Expanding dialogues and exchanges is a low-risk, high-impact way to enhance mutual understanding and build readiness. Taiwan’s vibrant academic and civil-society networks make it a natural partner for such engagement. Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues, bringing together think tanks, academic institutions and civil-society groups, provide valuable opportunities to share experiences, compare approaches and clarify the nature of Chinese threats, from cyber intrusions to air and maritime coercion.

Personnel exchanges involving retired military officers, policy experts and legislators also create informal but durable channels for sharing security perspectives. Deepening those links ensures that Taiwan’s perspective is better understood abroad, countering Beijing’s efforts to isolate it diplomatically. Such networks can also be drawn upon in times of crisis, providing trusted avenues for consultation and coordination.

Models already exist. Canada’s parliamentary friendship groups and Australia’s academic-level security conferences with Taiwan demonstrate how countries can maintain robust unofficial ties while operating within the constraints of their One-China policies.

Taiwan is a leader in advanced manufacturing and a critical node in global supply chains. That position gives it both strategic importance and unique vulnerabilities. As emerging security challenges such as drone warfare and cyber threats reshape the character of conflict, Taiwan and its partners have significant opportunities to pursue joint innovation.

Cooperation on dual-use technologies, such as drones and resilient communications networks, not only strengthens military readiness but also enhances civilian resilience. There’s considerable scope to connect Taiwanese research and development hubs with innovation ecosystems in Japan, Europe and other advanced economies.

Supply-chain security is another vital area for cooperation. Taiwan’s dominance in semiconductor production makes it a target during crises. Joint efforts to diversify sourcing, build redundancy and establish stockpiles of key components can significantly reduce Taiwanese and global vulnerabilities.

China’s influence campaigns have been particularly active in the Pacific, in Southeast Asia and among Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies. Nations can counter Beijing’s efforts by increasing their own diplomatic and development presence in those vulnerable regions. Aligning assistance with Taiwan’s existing programs and priorities offers a credible and attractive alternative to Chinese loans and infrastructure projects.

Support for Taiwan’s participation in international organisations is another crucial dimension, especially where internationally recognised statehood isn’t a requirement for participation. Backing Taipei’s observer status in bodies such as the World Health Organization and climate-related forums reinforces its role as a responsible stakeholder in the global community.

Quiet but consistent advocacy within ASEAN and other multilateral forums can also help to ensure that Taiwan’s concerns (particularly over maritime stability, trade and economic access) remain on the agenda, even in settings in which formal recognition is politically off-limits.

As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reminded the world, modern conflict isn’t just about military capability; it’s about the ability of an entire society to absorb shocks and continue functioning during coercion or conflict.

Civil–military integration training is a critical component. Preparing reserve forces and mobilising civil society to support the standing military can significantly enhance Taiwan’s defensive depth. Programs designed to train personnel in logistics and support functions make Taiwan less vulnerable to a single-point failure in the event of a crisis.

Opportunities for Taiwan’s reserve officers, civil-society leaders and technical specialists to engage with overseas training academies and partner institutions would raise readiness levels and broaden the country’s resilience toolkit. Such exchanges allow Taiwan to benefit from the hard-earned lessons of others, whether from Europe’s experience with hybrid warfare or from regional partners’ expertise in disaster response.

Importantly, states have flexibility in how they deliver that support. Direct military-to-military exchanges are often constrained by diplomatic considerations, but creative alternatives exist. Partnerships between first responders, such as local police, fire brigades and emergency medical services, offer valuable opportunities to strengthen resilience without breaching political sensitivities.

Taiwan’s ability to sustain essential imports of energy, food and raw materials is fundamental to its resilience in times of crisis or natural disaster. Strengthening cooperation in those areas provides a practical avenue for engagement.

Partner nations can engage in quiet but meaningful contingency planning with Taiwan across several areas. Countries can work with Taiwan to enhance maritime safety, port resilience and energy continuity planning. Shared initiatives might include improving maritime domain awareness through information sharing, developing protocols for disaster-response logistics, and ensuring that key ports can operate effectively under stress.

Joint workshops and scenario-based planning exercises can be held under the umbrella of regional disaster preparedness or humanitarian assistance. Such programs strengthen regional readiness for a range of contingencies, from typhoons to large-scale disruptions of shipping routes, while building habits of coordination that would prove valuable in more serious crises.

Regional maritime exercises could test those concepts. Even when Taiwan isn’t directly involved, exercises can be structured to test capabilities, such as convoy escort and replenishment at sea, that would be critical in supporting Taiwan during a crisis. This indirect approach allows partners to strengthen relevant operational skills while avoiding diplomatic sensitivities.