Over the decades, Taiwan’s defence strategy has undergone several major shifts, which helps to explain the current approach and challenges that Taiwan faces today.
Taiwan’s defence planning began in 1949 with ambitious goals to retake the Chinese mainland. Over time, it shifted through phases focused on forward defence, layered deterrence, and ultimately to a strategy centred on whole-of-society resilience and asymmetric capabilities.
Each of those changes reflected not only shifting political and military realities across the Taiwan Strait but also evolving thinking in Taipei about what would most credibly keep Taiwan safe.
- 1949
ROC government retreats to Taiwan after Chinese Civil War defeat.
- 1954
The first Taiwan Strait crisis. The US and ROC sign a mutual defence treaty.
- 1958
The second Taiwan Strait crisis. China resumes bombardment of Jinmen and Mazu.
- 1971
The UN adopts Resolution 2758, recognising the PRC as the sole legitimate representative of ‘China’ at the UN and expelling the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek.
- 1979
The US normalises ties with the PRC and ends the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC
- 1979
The US Congress passes the Taiwan Relations Act, ensuring arms sales and unofficial ties.
1949-1979
US support and the era of forward defence
In the years following 1949, Taiwan’s strategy was shaped by the hope of reclaiming the mainland. The ROC President, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, had retreated to Taiwan with that goal in mind, initially viewing the move as temporary. But the reality quickly set in: Taiwan lacked the military strength and sustained US backing to achieve that aim.
Taiwan thus pivoted to a forward defence strategy. Up to 150,000 troops were stationed on offshore islands such as Kinmen and Matsu, just miles from the Chinese coast. Those heavily fortified outposts were designed to deter or delay a Chinese invasion and demonstrate Taiwan’s resolve to hold territory near the mainland.
US support was pivotal. The Mutual Defense Treaty (1954) stationed American forces on Taiwan and underpinned Taipei’s security during the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954 and 1958, when artillery exchanges and brinkmanship tested both sides.
- 1982
The US quietly provides Taipei with the Six Assurances.
- 1987
Martial law is lifted in Taiwan and political liberalisation begins.
- 1991
Taiwan abandons the objective of taking the Chinese mainland by force.
- 1992
The 1992 Consensus between the CCP and KMT provides a mechanism to seek common ground while reserving differences.
- 1995–1996
The third Taiwan Strait crisis occurs when China fires missiles near Taiwan.
1979-2000
Isolation sets in and defense-in-depth takes over
The 1970s brought a major shift. US President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing and Washington’s formal recognition of the PRC in 1979 ended official ties with Taiwan, including the Mutual Defense Treaty. However, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 committed the US to supplying defensive weapons but stopped short of guaranteeing intervention. The Reagan administration’s ‘Six Assurances’ (1982) further clarified that arms sales would continue indefinitely.
With shrinking international support, Taiwan pursued self-reliance. Its ‘defence-in-depth’ strategy aimed to stop an invasion at multiple layers: engaging enemy forces in transit, striking offshore, and defeating them at the beachhead. Modernising the military and ramping up domestic arms production helped to ensure that any invasion would be costly and prolonged, allowing time for potential US intervention.
Taiwan’s democratic transition in the early 1990s further reshaped its strategy. The KMT formally abandoned claims to mainland territory in the so-called ‘1992 Consensus’ and tentatively agreed with the CCP that there was ‘one China’, although the two sides interpreted that concept differently.
Tensions flared again during the third Taiwan Strait crisis (1995–96), when Beijing fired missiles near Taiwan in response to perceived moves away from the One-China framework. US carrier groups were dispatched, but the crisis exposed weaknesses in Taiwan’s defence-in-depth, particularly its vulnerability to missile threats.
- 2005
China passes the Anti-Secession Law, asserting the right to use ‘non-peaceful means’ to achieve unification.
2000-2016
From ‘active defence’ to ‘hard ROC’
When the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power in 2000, Taiwan’s military was shrinking, and defence spending had fallen below 3% of GDP. Cross-strait relations were also deteriorating. Unlike the KMT, the DPP doesn’t subscribe to the 1992 Consensus and rejects the concept of ‘one China’.
President Chen Shui-bian introduced ‘active defence’, focusing on pre-emptively striking PLA forces before they could reach Taiwan. Investments included long-range precision weapons capable of hitting targets deep inside China. Beijing responded with the 2005 Anti-Secession Law, asserting the right to use ‘non-peaceful means’ to achieve unification.
When the KMT returned to power in 2008, President Ma Ying-jeou took a different approach. He favoured reducing tensions and adopted the ‘hard ROC’ (resilient operations concept) strategy. The strategy focused on making Taiwan’s military more mobile, dispersed and survivable, ready to ride out a surprise attack and deny the PLA a quick victory. The approach aligned with the KMT’s more conciliatory cross-strait policy and recognised the diplomatic and strategic risks of launching pre-emptive actions.
A key shift of ‘hard ROC’ was moving towards an all-volunteer, professional military force. During Taiwan’s martial law era, the military had around 600,000 troops. By 2016, that number had fallen to just 215,000, and defence spending had dropped to 1.8% of GDP, even as the PLA modernised and expanded.
- 2016
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen elected; the PRC halts cross-strait dialogue.
- 2017
Taiwan publicly adopts the ‘overall defence concept’.
- 2024
Taiwan extends mandatory military service from four months to one year.
2016–Present
Asymmetric resilience
President Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP was elected in 2016, ushering in a shift towards asymmetric defence through the ‘overall defence concept’ developed by Admiral Lee Hsi-ming. That strategy prioritised mobile, cost-effective systems, such as drones, naval mines and missile batteries, over conventional forces, aiming to deter and, if necessary, resist a PLA invasion.
Under Tsai, defence spending rose steadily, reaching 2.5% of GDP by 2024. Measures included strengthening domestic defence industries, extending mandatory military service from four months to one year, and reforming the reserves for greater responsiveness.
Recognising that modern conflicts extend beyond the military, Tsai also emphasised civil defence, preparing civilians for emergencies and reinforcing a whole-of-society approach. Tsai also deepened US ties through strategic dialogue, training and arms cooperation, enhancing Taiwan’s deterrence while seeking to avoid escalation.
Since May 2024, DPP President Lai Ching-te has built on those foundations. In response to escalating CCP pressure, Lai has pledged to raise defence spending to over 3.3% of GDP in 2026 and 5% by 2030, continue the shift towards asymmetric capabilities, and further integrate societal resilience into Taiwan’s defence posture.
The impact of Taiwan’s evolving defence strategy
Taiwan’s repeated shifts in defence strategy since 1949 have significant implications for its security and preparedness. The contrast between President Ma’s ‘hard ROC’ approach and the asymmetric, whole-of-society model pursued under presidents Tsai and Lai illustrates how deeply Taiwan’s defence posture is influenced by party ideology and political priorities.
On the military
Rather than being purely threat-driven, Taiwan’s strategies often reflect broader political values, such as a preference for conciliatory engagement versus hard deterrence. While that’s understandable in a democracy, each time the political leadership pivots, there’s a risk of half-implemented reforms and wasted resources. Such shifts can also create institutional dissonance. It takes years to properly train, equip and align a military with a specific doctrine.
On procurement
Each strategic pivot undermines the long-term planning that has supported military modernisation, and constant realignment to procurement priorities and cancelling or altering of major acquisitions and defence programs undermines the Taiwan military’s ability to keep pace with the PLA. Shifting from large, conventional platforms to smaller, agile systems under the asymmetric model, for instance, means discarding some legacy investments.
On society
The most recent shift towards a whole-of-society defence model under Tsai and Lai places new demands on civilian readiness. But Taiwan’s society, which is urbanised, prosperous and with limited experience of war, may be less willing to support such a model, given the lack of sustained political investment.
