Taiwan’s military preparations

Soldiers of the Chinese PLA

Taiwan is arguably more outmatched and outgunned by China’s military than at any time since 1949. Yet Taiwan is responding, albeit with far fewer resources. In 2024, President Lai appointed Wellington Koo as Taiwan’s Minister of National Defense—a bold and highly unusual choice, given Koo’s lack of prior military experience.

Traditionally, that position has been filled by former generals, whose military expertise was highly valued. However, past defence ministers have been criticised for adhering to outdated mindsets that prioritise conventional warfare and large, flashy equipment. Such perspectives often limited their ability to implement reforms aligned with the government’s increasingly urgent priorities.

Koo appears to be breaking with convention. Despite facing internal challenges and resistance to reform, he’s moving the military in a positive direction, advancing reforms that strengthen training and enhance Taiwan’s asymmetric capabilities.

Preparing the force

Training the force

Outdated drills have been retired: bayonet charges and goosestepping are gone, replaced by realistic, combat-focused training.

Han Kuang’ exercises have been revamped: Taiwan’s largest war games now span:

  • 14 days of computer-aided simulations
  • 10 days of live-fire combat drills
  • 24-hour brigade-level endurance tests, including night combat.

Urban warfare facilities are under construction, and drone operations are now part of core training, reflecting the modern battlefield.

Strengthening conscription and the reserves

In 2023, Taiwan reinstated one-year conscription, reversing the 2013 cut to four months:

  • New conscripts now train with advanced systems, such as Stinger and Javelin missiles, gaining real capability in asymmetric warfare.

The 1.66-million-strong reserve force is receiving:

  • a focus on rapid mobilisation and critical wartime support roles.

Civil–military integration

Old civil defence drills, once symbolic siren tests, have been replaced with realistic, city-wide resilience exercises:

  • 24/7 convenience stores act as emergency supply hubs.
  • Citizens rehearse roles in communications, logistics and emergency response.

Civil-society groups such as Forward Alliance offer training in:

  • first aid and crisis-survival skills
  • civil-defence readiness for all ages.

The All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency (established in 2021) oversees this effort, coordinating:

  • reserve call-ups
  • air-raid shelter readiness
  • essential stockpiles for prolonged crises.

Asymmetric capabilities

Taiwan is shifting its defence priorities away from traditional, large, and expensive platforms, such as tanks and conventional fighter jets, towards asymmetric capabilities. Those assets are acquired through both US procurement and a growing focus on indigenous weapons development, reflecting a strategic recalibration aimed at countering the PLA’s overwhelming conventional advantages.

Indigenous weapons development

Anti-ship missiles: The Hsiung Feng II and III are designed to target PLA surface vessels and amphibious landing craft, denying the PLA the ability to establish beachheads.

Air and missile defences: Systems such as the Tien Kung III can intercept PLA fighters, bombers and incoming ballistic missiles.

Missile corvettes: Tuo Chiang-class corvettes are highly manoeuvrable, stealthy platforms built for littoral strike missions, complicating PLA maritime operations.

Indigenous submarines: Hai Kun-class submarines are designed to disrupt PLA naval logistics, intercept amphibious forces and provide a hidden layer of defence.

UAVs: Cardinal short-range UAVs reflect lessons learned from the Ukraine war; Taiwan is expanding drone production and developing new drone units for potential PLA contingencies.

Sea mines and mine-layers: Min Jiang-class vessels can rapidly deploy minefields in the Taiwan Strait and key landing approaches, forcing PLA amphibious operations to slow or reroute.

Notable US platforms

Anti-armour weapons: Javelin missiles allow ground forces to disable PLA armoured and amphibious vehicles during landings.

Man-portable air defence systems: Stinger missiles can counter low-flying aircraft, helicopters and drones supporting PLA landings.

Coastal defence and anti-ship missiles: Harpoon missiles can disrupt PLA vessels approaching Taiwan, impeding amphibious landings and logistics.

Long-range precision artillery: HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) provides mobile, precise fire support against PLA staging areas.

Integrated air and missile defence: Patriot missile batteries can intercept PLA ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft approaching Taiwan.

Tanks and armoured vehicles: M1A2 Abrams tanks (108 ordered) strengthen Taiwan’s ground forces against PLA breakthroughs and support counterattacks.

Fighter jets: F-16V jets provide advanced air combat capabilities, including interception, defensive air operations and precision strike.

Rather than attempting to match the PLA’s sheer scale and firepower, Taiwan emphasises agility, stealth and survivability. By deploying smaller, mobile systems in dispersed and concealed locations, it aims to impose disproportionate costs on any invading force. Taiwan appears to be learning the lessons from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on how a smaller force can take on a much larger, and more powerful, military. That asymmetric approach also aligns with Taiwan’s constrained defence budget and smaller personnel numbers, maximising effectiveness despite resource limitations.

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