Blockade

Soldiers of the Chinese PLA

Since 2022, China has steadily increased the scale and tempo of its military exercises around Taiwan. In 2022, it took the PLA four days to encircle the island during drills. By 2023, that timeline was reduced to two days. By 2024, Chinese warships were able to complete a full maritime encirclement within just 24 hours.

A blockade would go far beyond a quarantine. Rather than selectively targeting vessels suspected of carrying ‘contraband’, it would be absolute, halting all shipping and air traffic to and from Taiwan.

PLA writings explicitly consider kinetic action as an integral part of a blockade. But a blockade could also be executed with less than kinetic options. China could deploy its navy to close major ports, use its air force to disrupt flight operations, and position aircraft carriers, submarines and missile systems to deter foreign intervention. Undersea internet cables might be cut, while cyberattacks cripple communications and critical infrastructure. On-island operatives, including special forces or fifth-column actors, could conduct sabotage to intensify pressure on Taipei. Beijing would be likely to manufacture a pretext to justify those moves.

But, regardless of the reasoning, a blockade is typically regarded as an act of war and carries real risk of military intervention from the US and others.

China’s excessive claims and sensitive areas